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Slapping Criminal Speech:
How Evolution of the
Illegality Exception Has
Impacted California’s AntiSLAPP Statute
Orlando J. Villalba*
The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most
precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak,
write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses
of this freedom as shall be defined by law.1
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INTRODUCTION
For hundreds of years, democracy proponents have
emphasized the need to protect speech. Indeed, many of our
country’s earliest leaders believed protecting speech was so
important that they made freedom of speech the first of all of our
fundamental rights secured within the Bill of Rights (and likely
would not have approved of the Constitution but for the general
understanding that a Bill of Rights would be adopted
immediately after ratification).2 And while the limits of free
speech have been tested on numerous occasions in our nation’s
history, it remains among our most cherished freedoms.
In 1992, California, like many other states, affirmed the
importance of protecting speech when it adopted legislation
2

Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 869 (1960).
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aimed at curbing so-called “SLAPP” lawsuits.3
SLAPPs
(“strategic lawsuits against public participation”) are meritless
lawsuits filed for the purpose of repressing free speech and
petitioning rights.4 California’s anti-SLAPP legislation sought to
provide SLAPP defendants, who were essentially being sued for
exercising their free speech rights, a means by which to achieve
early termination of lawsuits against them.5
Anti-SLAPP
legislation was initially seen as a great victory for free speech.
But free speech is not always so pleasant and appealing and,
perhaps more importantly, does not always render itself so
attractive to our protective senses. Inevitably, uncomfortable
scenarios cause us to question the extent of permissible speech.
What should we do when somebody burns our flag? Or, when
somebody speaks in discriminatory tones? Or, when somebody’s
speech borders on (or even crosses the line of) illegality? It is this
last question which seems to have posed particular difficulty for
California courts of late, especially as such courts have been
called upon ever more frequently to interpret the extent of
protection provided by anti-SLAPP legislation.
The instant article addresses what has become known in
California as the illegality exception to the anti-SLAPP statute: a
court-created carve-out to the anti-SLAPP statute which exempts
illegal speech from the statute’s protections. Part I of this article
provides a brief background to California’s anti-SLAPP law,
reviewing its historical underpinnings as well as its procedural
mechanics. Part II details the development and evolution of the
illegality exception, with particular attention to the conflicting
and sometimes unpredictable use of illegality (and, in more
recent times, criminality) as a means to determine application of
the exception. Finally, Part III of this article diagnoses the
present and future application of the illegality exception and
offers ideas for remediation of the most concerning contradictions
in the application of the doctrine.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S ANTI-SLAPP LAW
A. Historical Development
According to sociologists, the term SLAPP litigation refers to
“civil lawsuits that are aimed at preventing citizens from
exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done
Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693–94 (Ct. App. 1994).
GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 1–3 (1996).
5 See, e.g., Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 682 (Ct. App.
1999).
3
4
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so.”6 SLAPP suits are “brought to obtain an economic advantage
over the defendant, not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of
the plaintiff.”7 Indeed, the motivation of the SLAPP plaintiff is
not to win his or her lawsuit; instead, the plaintiff’s true desire is
to cause “delay and distraction . . . and to punish activists by
imposing litigation costs on them for exercising their
constitutional right to speak and petition the government for
redress of grievances.”8
An oft-referred to example of a
prototypical SLAPP suit is one “filed by a well-heeled land
developer trying to silence a neighborhood organization that
protests the developer’s plans.”9 Additional examples of SLAPP
suits typically involve alleged causes of action for “defamation,
various business torts such as interference with prospective
economic advantage, nuisance, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.”10
In 1992, the California Legislature responded to the
escalating numbers of SLAPP suits by enacting section 425.16 of
the California Civil Procedure Code (commonly referred to as the
anti-SLAPP statute).11 In adopting the anti-SLAPP statute, the
Legislature observed:
[T]here has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily
to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature
finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this
participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process.12

Because otherwise meritless SLAPP suits seek to deplete
“‘the defendant’s energy’ and drain ‘his or her resources’ . . . the
Legislature sought ‘to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and
without great cost to the SLAPP target.’”13
With the enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute, SLAPP
defendants were empowered with the ability to file a new type of
6 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35
SOC. PROBS. 506, 506 (1988)), overruled by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52
P.3d 685, 694 n.5 (Cal. 2002).
7 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450.
8 Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693.
9 Visher v. City of Malibu, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 816, 819 (Ct. App. 2005).
10 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
11 Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693.
12 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2011).
13 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 966 (Cal. 2005) (quoting Simmons
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 401 (Ct. App. 2001); Equilon Enters. v.
Consumer Cause, 52 P.3d 685, 692–93 (Cal. 2002)).
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“special motion to strike.”14 More specifically, subsection (b) of
the statute provides that:
[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person
in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.15

In enacting the anti-SLAPP statute, the Legislature
identified four categories of “acts” which are protected by the
statute, and thus subject to the special motion to strike:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law,
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest, or
(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.16

Aside from the above general categories of protected acts, the
Legislature did not limit application of the provision to any
specific types of actions, “recognizing that all kinds of claims
could achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit—to interfere with
and burden the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.”17
Indeed, “[n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any
particular type of action from its operation.”18 As a result, the
anti-SLAPP statute has been found applicable to a wide range of
actions, including breach of contract and fraud claims,19
defamation claims,20 malicious prosecution claims,21 abuse of
process claims,22 and even petitions for injunctive relief.23
14
15
16
17

1996).

CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1).
Id.
Id. at § 425.16(e).
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 634 (Ct. App.

Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002).
See, e.g., id. at 713; Midland Pac. Bldg. Corp. v. King, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 501
(Ct. App. 2007); Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 507 (Ct. App. 2007).
20 See, e.g., Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 2008);
Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 757 (Ct. App. 2007); McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego,
64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 488 (Ct. App. 2007); Computerxpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr.
18
19
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B. Procedural Mechanics
The anti-SLAPP statute seeks to protect SLAPP defendants
by providing them a procedure to obtain early dismissal of
meritless claims and insulating them from the costs and
intrusions of discovery prior to dismissal.24
This aim is
accomplished through several mechanisms provided in the
statute.25
Initially, the statute limits discovery once a special motion to
strike is filed, providing that “[a]ll discovery proceedings in the
action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made
pursuant to this section.”26
This discovery stay generally
remains in effect until the court rules on the defendant’s special
motion to strike.27 A plaintiff can move for relief from this stay
in order to conduct limited and specified discovery, but whether
such relief is allowed is subject to the trial court’s finding of good
cause.28
As for the procedure of the motion itself, a special motion to
strike allows the trial court to “evaluate[] the merits of the
lawsuit using a summary judgment-like procedure at an early
stage of the litigation.”29 To encourage this early resolution, the
statute allows a defendant to bring its special motion to strike
“within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s
discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.”30 Oral
argument on the motion “shall be scheduled by the clerk of the
court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the
motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later
hearing.”31

2d 625, 632, 649 (Ct. App. 2001); Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,
685 (Ct. App. 1999).
21 See, e.g., Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 739 (Cal. 2003); Daniels
v. Robbins, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 688 (Ct. App. 2010); Drummond v. Desmarais, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 183, 186–87 (Ct. App. 2009); Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann, 69
Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 567 (Ct. App. 2007).
22 See, e.g., Booker v. Rountree, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 2007); Ramona
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 384 (Ct. App. 2005).
23 See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 635 (Ct. App.
2006); Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 621 (Ct. App. 2005); Bernardo v.
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 203 (Ct. App. 2004).
24 See, e.g., Sipple, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
25 Id.
26 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2011).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 106 P.3d 958, 966 (Cal. 2005).
30 CIV. PROC. § 425.16(f).
31 Id.
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In determining whether to strike a claim under the antiSLAPP statute, the court engages in a two-step analysis.32 In the
first step, “the court decides whether the defendant has made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one
arising from protected activity.”33 “A defendant meets this
burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s
cause fits one of the categories spelled out in [section 425.16]
subdivision (e).”34 If the court finds that defendant has made a
satisfactory showing on the first step, the court then must
determine “whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability
of prevailing on the claim.”35 “Only a cause of action that
satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises
from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal
merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”36
In considering the defendant’s burden on the first prong, it is
important to recognize that “[s]ection 425.16 applies to a cause of
action arising from an act in furtherance of a person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue.”37 Therefore, the
most important consideration in the first prong analysis “is
whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected
free speech or petitioning activity.”38
Moreover, the “definitional focus” of this inquiry “is not the
form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s
activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or
petitioning.”39 As such, an anti-SLAPP defendant need not
necessarily establish its actions are constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment as a matter of law.40 Rather, the
32 See Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002); Equilon Enters. v.
Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 2002); Ramona Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 387 (Ct. App. 2005).
33 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Equilon, 52 P.3d at 694.
34 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Braun v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 61
(Ct. App. 1997).
35 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708; Equilon, 52 P.3d at 694. See also Computerxpress, Inc.
v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 632 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff
to establish a probability of prevailing, by making a prima facie showing of facts which
would, if proved, support a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.”).
36 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 708.
37 Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534,
540 (Ct. App. 2002).
38 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 709.
39 Id. at 711. See also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
620, 634 (Ct. App. 1996).
40 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994). See also Oasis
W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1126 (Cal. 2011); Navellier, 52 P.3d at 713;
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statute merely requires a defendant to make “a prima facie
showing [that] the plaintiff’s suit arises ‘from any act of
[defendant] in furtherance of [defendant’s] right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.’”41 And, in determining whether
this showing has been made, a court should emphasize substance
over form; it is the “principal thrust or gravamen of a cause of
action [that] determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute
applies.”42 Indeed, “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute does not apply
where protected activity is only collateral or incidental to the
purpose of the transaction or occurrence underlying the
complaint.”43
As noted, “the Legislature did not intend that in order to
invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first
establish [that his or] her actions are constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment as a matter of law.”44
Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume
the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue
in the second step of the analysis, if necessary. . . . Otherwise, the
second step would become superfluous in almost every case, resulting
in an improper shifting of the burdens.45

Thus, where a defendant meets his burden as to the first
prong, the court then proceeds to evaluate the plaintiff’s burden
on the second prong.46 In this phase of the analysis, “the trial
court must consider facts so as to make a determination whether
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie probability of prevailing on
their claims.”47 Though the court does not weigh the evidence
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Ct. App. 2001).
41 Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West
2011) (second and third alterations in original). See also Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102
Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 870 (Ct. App. 2001), Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d
685, 694 n.5 (Cal. 2002); Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630.
42 Cal. Back Specialists Med. Grp. v. Rand, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 2008).
See also Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 585 (Ct. App.
2007); Ramona Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tsiknas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 388 (Ct. App. 2005);
Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2003).
43 Rand, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 272. See also Baharian-Mehr v. Smith, 117 Cal. Rptr.
3d 153, 159 (Ct. App. 2010); Wang, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 585;; Scott v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 249 (Ct. App. 2004);; Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d
494, 499 (Ct. App. 2003).
44 Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.
45 Chavez v. Mendoza, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 2001).
46 See Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011); Zamos v.
Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 806 (Cal. 2004); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002);
Equilon Enters., 52 P.3d at 694.
47 Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 398 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis
omitted).
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presented, “it must determine whether plaintiffs have
demonstrated evidence which, if credited, would justify their
prevailing at trial.”48
In determining whether the plaintiff has met her burden on
the second prong, the court considers whether the plaintiff has
“demonstrate[d] that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.”49 However, several cases have held that a plaintiff
need only show that her case has “minimal merit” to meet this
burden.50 Despite the statistical confusion this standard might
create,51 upon such a showing of minimal merit, the defendant’s
motion to strike will be denied and the case will proceed forward
in litigation.52
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ILLEGALITY EXCEPTION
While litigants pursuing and opposing anti-SLAPP motions
must be prepared to address both prongs of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, the remainder of this article, with a few exceptions,
focuses primarily upon the first prong.
A compelling
development has taken place over the past ten years with respect
to how courts are applying the anti-SLAPP statute to speech and
petitioning activity that straddles and sometimes crosses the
lines of illegality. California courts have lacked consistency in
determining how much protection the anti-SLAPP statute should
provide in these instances. As shown below, while California
courts initially applied a wide-ranging exclusion to these types of
speech and activity, that exclusion appears to be retracting and
taking on an air of uncertainty.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995).
50 See, e.g., Goldman, 250 P.3d at 1120; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139
P.3d 30, 51 (Cal. 2006); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 745 (Cal. 2003);
Navellier, 52 P.3d at 712.
51 It is true that few ever accuse attorneys of being mathematicians.
Judicial
adoption of the “minimal merit” standard in anti-SLAPP cases might help explain why.
After all, section 425.16(b)(1) provides that an action arising from one’s right to petition or
exercise free speech will be stricken unless the plaintiff can establish “a probability” of
prevailing on the claim in question. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2011).
Merriam-Webster defines “probability” as “the quality or state of being probable,” and in
turn, defines “probable” as both “supported by evidence strong enough to establish
presumption but not proof” and “likely to be or become true or real.” ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 989 (Frederick C. Mish et al.
eds., 11th ed. 2008). Something that is probable (or, by extension, presumed or likely)
would therefore seem to be of greater reliability than mere “minimal merit.” Id.
52 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 51; Jarrow Formulas, 74 P.3d at 745; Navellier, 52 P.3d at
712.
48
49
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A. The Birth of the Anti-SLAPP Statute’s Illegality Exception
The first major development in the life of the anti-SLAPP
statute’s illegality exception occurred in the California Court of
Appeal’s 2001 decision Paul for Council v. Hanyecz.53 Paul
involved a political action committee (the plaintiff), which had
been formed to assist Paul Christiansen in his bid for reelection
to the Laguna Niguel City Council.54 Defendants were three
individuals, whom the plaintiff alleged had wrongfully interfered
with Christiansen’s candidacy by influencing the election with
illegal campaign contributions to Christiansen’s opponent.55
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendants’ actions amounted
to a violation of the Political Reform Act of 1974.56
In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants filed a special
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.57 In their
motion, defendants acknowledged that they did, in fact, engage
in actions to subvert the political contribution rules.58 They did
this by having certain family members make contributions to
various candidates, then reimbursing their family members for
such contributions.59
Thus, as the court considered the
defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, there was no dispute among the
parties that defendants had violated the Political Reform Act.60
Nonetheless, defendants claimed they were entitled to
protection under the anti-SLAPP statute because their actions
were done in furtherance of their political speech rights.61 More
specifically, defendants claimed their money laundering was “in
furtherance of their constitutional rights of free speech,” and
arose “out of acts in furtherance of their constitutionally
protected conduct.”62 The trial court agreed with defendants and
granted their special motion to strike.63 Plaintiffs appealed, and
the court of appeal framed the question on appeal as:
[W]hether a defendant can properly claim that an action filed against
it is a SLAPP suit for which it is entitled to section 425.16 protection,
when its conduct involved actions which violate the law; or to put it

53 See Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12 (discussing Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr.
2d 864 (Ct. App. 2001)).
54 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 871.
61 Id. at 867.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 868.

Do Not Delete

2012]

1/31/2012 9:51 PM

Slapping Criminal Speech

547

another way, can a defendant successfully assert that although the
acts in which it engaged, and which are the subject of the plaintiff’s
complaint, were illegal, they were done in furtherance of the
constitutional rights of free speech or petition for redress of grievances
in connection with a public issue and therefore the plaintiff is
required, under section 425.16, to meet the predicate showing
mandated by that statute?64

The court of appeal answered this question by concluding
that, “in such circumstances, defendants are not entitled to
protection under section 425.16.”65 In reaching this result, the
court considered this issue to exist solely within the context of
the first prong, noting: “we need not address the second step of
section 425.16’s two-step motion to strike process because we
hold, as a matter of law, that defendants cannot meet their
burden on the first step.”66
In engaging in the first prong’s “arising from” analysis, the
Paul court emphasized the policy of the statute in protecting the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of speech and petition.
The court acknowledged defendants’ contention that their
campaign money laundering activity was taken “in furtherance”
of their constitutional right of free speech, and that “it is
technically true that laundering campaign contributions is an act
in furtherance of the giving of such contributions, that is, in
furtherance of an act of free speech.”67 However, the court
“reject[ed] the notion that section 425.16 exists to protect such
illegal activity” as money laundering.68 As such, defendants had
failed to show the court that “plaintiff’s suit was brought
primarily to chill a valid exercise . . . of free speech or petition,”
and thus had failed to satisfy their burden regarding the first
prong’s “arising from” requirement.69
In the course of reaching its holding, the Paul court was
remarkably careful in framing how its decision should be
understood by future parties and courts.70 The court made a
point to emphasize that its decision “involve[d] a factual context
in which the defendants have effectively conceded the illegal
nature of their election campaign finance activities for which
they claim constitutional protection.”71 As such,

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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there was no dispute on the point and we have concluded, as a matter
of law, that such activities are not a valid exercise of constitutional
rights as contemplated by section 425.16. However, had there been a
factual dispute as to the legality of defendants’ actions, then we could
not so easily have disposed of defendants’ motion.72

The court warned that, in future cases, where a plaintiff
contests [the] point [of illegality], and unlike the case here, cannot
demonstrate as a matter of law that the defendant’s acts do not fall
under section 425.16’s protection, then the claimed illegitimacy of
defendant’s acts is an issue which [the] plaintiff must raise and
support in the context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s burden to
provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.73

The Paul court further referred to this showing as
an additional burden” which the plaintiff must meet “in the same
manner the plaintiff meets the burden of demonstrating the merits of
its causes of action: by showing the defendant’s purported
constitutional defenses are not applicable to the case as a matter of
law or by a prima facie showing of facts which, if accepted by the trier
of fact, would negate such defenses.74

Though the Paul court made these final points “[i]n order to
avoid any misunderstanding as to the basis for [its]
conclusions,”75 it may have instead created more confusion and
uncertainty by its parting words than it would have otherwise.
As the court acknowledged, its case was an easy one because the
issue of illegality was not contested.76 Rather than limiting its
opinion to the facts before it, however, the Paul court continued
to opine as to how courts should proceed in the event they
encountered different and more difficult facts.77 Where future
cases involve disputed illegality, the court professed, an
“additional burden” shifts to the plaintiff to show that defendant
is not entitled to the constitutional protections it seeks.78 By
referring to this burden as “additional” to the one already faced
by the plaintiff in the context of the second prong, the Paul court
seemingly created a third prong for cases specifically involving
speech and petitioning activities which potentially cross the line
of illegality.79 However, given the court’s ambiguity as to
plaintiff’s “additional burden,” the third prong is at best
amorphous under Paul.
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id. at 871–72.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id. at 871–72.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 872.
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In the years following, Paul’s illegality exception was
acknowledged and accepted by other appellate courts in
California.80
Indeed, in 2002, California’s Fifth Appellate
District was faced with an appeal where the plaintiff sought
application of the illegality exception.81 In Kashian v. Harriman,
a prominent businessman and civic leader (Kashian) sued an
attorney (Harriman) for claims of unfair business practices and
defamation in connection with several environmental lawsuits
filed by Harriman, as well as a letter written by Harriman and
later published by the Fresno Bee newspaper.82
In response to Kashian’s complaint, Harriman filed an antiSLAPP motion, contending that his litigation activities and letter
were absolutely privileged.83
Kashian opposed the motion
primarily on second prong grounds, submitting evidence in
support of the claims and arguing that the actions of Harriman
were not privileged.84 The trial court granted the motion, and
Kashian appealed.85 On appeal, Kashian shifted his focus, and
argued that, under Paul, Harriman was not entitled to relief
under the anti-SLAPP statute because the statute does not
protect illegal activity.86 The appellate court, however, noted
that the facts in Paul were distinguishable because, here, “the
legality of Harriman’s litigation activities is a matter of
considerable dispute.”87 The court went on to add that “conduct
that would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP
statute does not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged
to have been unlawful or unethical. If that were the test, the
statute (and the privilege) would be meaningless.”88 The court,
therefore, directed its attention to the second prong before
ultimately affirming the trial court’s decision.89

80 See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 644 (Ct. App.
2006); Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty U.S.A., Inc., 29 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 521, 535 (Ct. App. 2005); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789,
801–02 (Ct. App. 2003); Yu v. Signet Bank/Va., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 529 n.3 (Ct. App.
2002); Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534,
541–42 (Ct. App. 2002); Chavez v. Mendoza, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 2001).
81 Kashian v. Harriman, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 589 (Ct. App. 2002).
82 Id. at 581–84.
83 Id. at 584.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 585.
86 Id. at 589.
87 Id. at 590.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 591, 609. Interestingly, though the case involved a disputed allegation of
illegality regarding Harriman’s petitioning activity, the court did not appear to engage in
any “third prong” type of analysis contemplated by Paul.
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Later in 2002, California’s First Appellate District similarly
encountered an appeal involving a special motion to strike
opposed on the basis of illegal petitioning activities.90 In
Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance,
a group supporting the reelection of Governor Gray Davis filed an
action against a taxpayers group (“taxpayers”) responsible for a
television commercial critical of Davis, claiming the taxpayers
violated the Political Reform Act’s reporting requirements.91
Taxpayers responded by filing a special motion to strike the
complaint, characterizing Davis’ claims as “a classic SLAPP
suit.”92 After the trial court denied the motion, the court of
appeal reviewed the matter de novo.93 In addressing the
illegality issue under the first prong analysis, the court observed
that this case was again unlike Paul in that illegality had not
been conceded by the defendant taxpayers, and the evidence did
not otherwise conclusively establish illegality.94 Therefore, the
court concluded that the defendant taxpayers had met its burden
under the first prong, and the burden shifted to plaintiff Davis to
establish a probability of prevailing on the merits.95
Interestingly, in turning the matter over to the second prong
analysis, the court referenced Paul’s guidance in handling
matters of disputed illegality.96 Citing Paul, the Davis court
observed that the “asserted violation of the Political Reform Act
by appellant is an issue we must examine in the context of the
discharge of the respondent’s burden to construct a prima facie
showing of the merits of its case.”97 The court then analyzed the
scope of the Political Reform Act in the face of the speech
protections under the First Amendment.98 Concluding that the
Political Reform Act must be read narrowly to preserve free
speech rights, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish
a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.99 The court’s analysis in
this respect negated Paul’s “additional burden” prophecy,
engaging in the continued illegality analysis strictly through the
second prong’s underlying merits examination. As shown below,
90 See Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534
(Ct. App. 2002).
91 Id. at 538.
92 Id. at 539.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 542.
95 Id. (“[W]ith the legality of appellant’s exercise of a constitutionally protected right
in dispute in the action, the threshold element in a section 425.16 inquiry has been
established.”).
96 Id. at 541–42.
97 Id. at 542.
98 Id. at 551.
99 Id. at 551–52.
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the Davis court’s deviation from Paul in this manner served as
an early example of the inconsistent manner in which the
illegality exception would be applied by California courts.100
B. The California Supreme Court Endorses the Illegality
Exception in Flatley v. Mauro
In 2006, the California Supreme Court decided Flatley v.
Mauro,101 the landmark case on the illegality exception. With
Flatley, the court gave even greater legitimacy to the exception,
endorsing Paul’s analysis and application of the doctrine.102
Flatley involved a dispute between an entertainer, Michael
Flatley, and an attorney, Dean Mauro, who represented Tyna
Marie Robertson (a former paramour of Flatley’s).103 Following a
tryst between Robertson and Flatley, Mauro sent a letter to
Flatley accusing him of sexually assaulting Robertson.104 The
letter included a draft of an unfiled civil complaint against
Flatley for the assault, and further demanded a settlement
payment of $100 million.105 Mauro threatened that if settlement
was not reached between the parties, Mauro would disclose
various details of the incident and various other personal details
about Flatley to the press and several governmental and law
enforcement agencies.106 Mauro continued to make similar
demands in several telephone calls with Flatley’s attorneys
following this letter, where the settlement amount was described
as at least “seven figures.”107
Flatley did not pay Mauro, and Mauro subsequently filed the
complaint against Flatley.108
Mauro and Robertson then
appeared on television, recounting the allegations that Flatley
had raped Robertson.109 Robertson later dismissed her claims
against Flatley.110
Meanwhile, Flatley filed suit against Mauro, alleging civil
extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
wrongful interference with economic advantage.111 The claims

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See infra Parts II(B), II(C), & II(D).
Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 5, 9.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5 n.2.
Id. at 5.
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were based upon the demand letter Flatley received from Mauro,
as well as the telephone calls Mauro made to Flatley’s
attorneys.112 Mauro responded to the complaint by filing a
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.113 Mauro
argued that his communications were “prelitigation settlement
offer[s],” and as such, Flatley’s claims arose from Mauro’s
protected right of petition.114 Though he did not deny sending
the letter in question nor did he contest the nature of the
telephone calls as described by Flatley, Mauro nonetheless
maintained that his activity on behalf of Robertson “amounted to
no more than the kind of permissible settlement negotiations
that are attendant upon any legal dispute or, at minimum, that a
question of fact exists regarding the legality of his conduct,”
which he claimed precluded a finding of illegality.115
Predictably, Flatley opposed the motion.116 Flatley argued
“Mauro’s communications constituted criminal extortion and
were therefore not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute,” and
that Flatley “could demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the
merits.”117 The trial court denied the motion, and the court of
appeal affirmed.118 “The Court of Appeal held that, because
Mauro’s letter and subsequent telephone calls constituted
criminal extortion as a matter of law, and extortionate speech is
not constitutionally protected, the anti-SLAPP statute did not
apply.”119 Mauro then appealed to the California Supreme
Court.120
In an opinion drafted by Justice Moreno, the supreme court
relied heavily on Paul, devoting five pages of its opinion toward
specifically reviewing and analyzing the Paul opinion.121 In the
end, the court endorsed Paul’s application of the illegality
exception:
We agree with Paul that section 425.16 cannot be invoked by a
defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of
law and, for that reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees of
free speech and petition. A contrary rule would be inconsistent with
the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute as revealed by its language.122

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 10–14.
Id. at 13.
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The supreme court went on to encapsulate the illegality
exception as follows:
[W]here a defendant brings a motion to strike under section 425.16
based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises from activity by the
defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of protected
speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or the
evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech
or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is
precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s
action.123

The court also made clear its position that determination of
the illegality exception is strictly a first prong matter:
[W]e emphasize that the question of whether the defendant’s
underlying conduct was illegal as a matter of law is preliminary, and
unrelated to the second prong question of whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing, and the showing required to
establish conduct illegal as a matter of law—either through
defendant’s concession or by uncontroverted and conclusive evidence—
is not the same showing as the plaintiff’s second prong showing of
probability of prevailing.124

In turning to the specific facts before it, the court applied the
illegality exception to Mauro’s detriment. The court noted case
law establishing the proposition that extortion is not a
constitutionally protected form of speech.125 The court further
observed that the facts establishing extortion were not in dispute
since Mauro did not deny sending the letter or engaging in the
telephone calls.126 Therefore, evaluating Mauro’s conduct, the
court concluded that “the letter and subsequent phone calls
constitute[d] criminal extortion as a matter of law.”127 The court
relied upon sections 519(2) and (3) of the California Penal Code
in emphasizing that “[t]hese communications threatened to
‘accuse’ Flatley of, or ‘impute to him,’ ‘crime[s]’ and ‘disgrace’
unless Flatley paid Mauro.”128 That the threats were halfcouched in legalese, the court noted, does not disguise their
essential character as extortion.129 Because Mauro’s actions
amounted to extortion as a matter of law, and were therefore not
constitutionally protected nor entitled to anti-SLAPP protection,

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 15.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 519(2), (3) (West 2011)).
Id.
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the supreme court affirmed the denial of Mauro’s special motion
to strike.130
Notably, although the supreme court’s decision was
unanimous, Justice Werdegar drafted a concurring opinion in
Flatley, deviating sharply from the reasoning employed by
Justice Moreno and the majority, and strongly cautioning against
the adoption of an illegality exception.131 For one, he argued that
such an exception is better left to the Legislature than the
Judiciary.132 He pointed to the Legislature’s amendment of
section 425.18(h), where it limited “SLAPPback” motions brought
by parties whose actions in the underlying case were “illegal as a
matter of law.”133 If the Legislature wanted a similar exception
with respect to section 425.16, it could have adopted one
statutorily.134
Justice Werdegar also questioned the breadth of the
majority’s illegality exception.135 He feared that, by precluding
lawsuits based upon “illegal” actions, perhaps the exception
would swallow the entire rule: “[s]ince by definition all conduct
sued upon is alleged to be illegal, the majority’s assurances that
the ‘narrow circumstance’ . . . for plaintiffs’ invoking an illegalas-a-matter-of-law defense to an anti-SLAPP motion will occur
only in ‘rare cases’ . . . are not convincing.”136
Justice Werdegar also criticized the practicality of treating
the illegality exception solely as a first prong issue: “[t]he
standard the majority articulates for its new exception . . . is
virtually indistinguishable from the standard we previously have
articulated for satisfying the statute’s second prong.”137 Justice
Werdegar referenced the supreme court’s prior opinion in
Navellier v. Sletten, cautioning that the majority’s now
conflicting guidance is likely to cause confusion among lower
courts. He further added that the similarity between application
of the illegality exception and the second prong analysis
may well sow doctrinal confusion among courts previously given to
understand that “any claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s acts is an
issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the

Id. at 24.
Id. at 24–26 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
132 Id.
133 Id. As discussed more fully below, a “SLAPPback” motion is essentially an antiSLAPP motion seeking to dismiss a malicious prosecution action brought in response to
an earlier action previously dismissed by an anti-SLAPP motion.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 25–26.
136 Id. at 25 (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12, 15).
137 Id. at 26.
130
131
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discharge of the plaintiff’s [secondary] burden to provide a prima facie
showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.”138

In the end, however, Justice Werdegar agreed that Mauro
was not entitled to relief under the anti-SLAPP statute.139 He
concluded that Mauro failed to show that the lawsuit arose from
protected speech or petitioning activity.140 In other words, while
the majority concluded Mauro was not entitled to protection
because his speech and petitioning activity was illegal, Justice
Werdegar found that the lawsuit was not based upon speech or
petitioning activity in the first place.141 The gravamen of
Flatley’s claims was Mauro’s attempt to extort money from him,
and, according to Werdegar, such an action does not arise from
protected speech or petitioning.142
The Werdegar concurrence raised several red flags
concerning the application of Flatley, Paul, and the illegality
exception in future cases. Notably, should the judiciary expand
on developing this doctrine when the Legislature has not
specifically incorporated the doctrine into the anti-SLAPP statute
(despite having done so with respect to section 425.18)? And,
what exactly does “illegality as a matter of law” mean? Is it not
true that every lawsuit potentially involves allegations of
illegality? Finally, is the illegality exception truly a first prong
issue, or does Flatley’s pronouncement of the exception render it
identical to the analysis called for under the second prong? As
shown below, while some cases have applied Flatley and Paul
with little difficulty or confusion, others seem to fall directly into
the pitfalls Justice Werdegar raised, rendering future application
of these doctrines inconsistent and perhaps unpredictable.143
C. Applying the Illegality Exception Immediately After Flatley
i. Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
It did not take long to see Flatley’s direct impact on other
cases. In a companion case to Flatley, the California Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert
Hafif,144 on the same day it announced its decision in Flatley.
Though Soukup’s facts differ from Flatley, its decision sheds

138

2002)).
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712 (Cal.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II(C).
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2006).
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further clarification on the reasoning and intent underlying the
Flatley decision.
In Soukup, the plaintiff (Peggy Soukup) was a former
employee of defendant (Law Offices of Herbert Hafif or
“LOHH”).145 LOHH had previously sued Soukup and others for
malicious prosecution, among other claims, in an underlying
action.146 Soukup moved to strike that action based upon the
anti-SLAPP statute, and the court granted her motion and
dismissed LOHH’s claims against Soukup.147
Following the dismissal of LOHH’s claims in the underlying
action, Soukup filed a new action against LOHH and others,
claiming abuse of process and malicious prosecution.148 In turn,
LOHH and the other defendants moved to strike Soukup’s claim
based upon the anti-SLAPP statute.149 LOHH’s anti-SLAPP
motion created a “SLAPPback” scenario, but, at the time this
motion had been filed, the California Legislature had not yet
adopted the SLAPPback legislation that exists today.150 Soukup
opposed LOHH’s motion, arguing that the underlying activity
upon which her suit was based is, by definition, not protected
speech because she had already achieved its dismissal by way of
her prior anti-SLAPP motion.151 The trial court ultimately
denied LOHH’s motion.152 LOHH appealed and the court of
appeal reversed, leading to an appeal to the California Supreme
Court.153
During the time after the trial court denied LOHH’s motion
to strike and before the supreme court made its decision, the
California Legislature enacted new legislation regarding
SLAPPbacks.154 This legislation sought to protect litigants who
had previously been successful in dismissing claims by use of the
anti-SLAPP statute and who subsequently filed malicious
prosecution actions against their SLAPPers (an action known as

Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
147 Id. at 39.
148 Id. at 40.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 35.
151 Id. at 40.
152 Id. at 41.
153 Id. The appellate court first affirmed, but was directed to reconsider its ruling in
light of the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche,
74 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2003), and Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002). Soukup, 139
P.3d at 42. Upon reconsideration in light of Jarrow and Navellier, the court of appeal
reversed, leading to Soukup’s petition for review to the California Supreme Court. Id.
154 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 35.
145
146
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a “SLAPPback”).155
As part of the new legislation, the
Legislature incorporated its own illegality exception with respect
to special motions to strike SLAPPback suits: “A special motion
to strike may not be filed against a SLAPPback by a party whose
filing or maintenance of the prior cause of action from which the
SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law.”156
In light of the newly enacted SLAPPback legislation, Soukup
argued to the supreme court that LOHH is not entitled to antiSLAPP relief given the SLAPPback statute’s illegality
exception.157 She argued that LOHH’s underlying lawsuit was a
violation of state and federal law, namely section 1102.5 of the
California Labor Code and 29 U.S.C. § 1140.158 The supreme
court disagreed with Soukup insofar as it concluded that she
could not establish a violation of these statutes as a matter of
law.159
Both
of
the
statutes
were
forms
of
retaliation/whistleblower regulations, which required that she
prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between LOHH and herself.160 Because Soukup was not an
employee at the time the actions had been filed, she could not
establish violations of these statutes as a matter of law.161
Accordingly, the court concluded the first prong of the analysis
had been satisfied and the matter would hinge upon a
determination under the second prong’s probability of prevailing
analysis.162
Though Soukup differentiates itself from Flatley in the sense
that its decision hinges upon its application and interpretation of
section 425.18 of the California Civil Procedure Code, rather than
section 425.16, several notable aspects of the opinion shed light
upon the court’s intention behind Flatley.
For one, it is
interesting to note that Soukup sought to employ the illegality
exception based upon two non-criminal statutes.163 In other
words, Soukup’s argument completely avoided the question of
whether illegality requires criminality in this context. And even
though the Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with Soukup’s
application of the illegality exception, it did so on grounds other
than criminality.164 It would appear to have been much easier for
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 42–43.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(h) (West Supp. 2011).
Soukup, 139 P.3d at 45.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 48–49.
Id.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
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the court to dispose of Soukup’s argument by noting that the
statutes she relied upon were not criminal statutes, and thus she
was not entitled to the illegality exception. The fact that the
court did not do so may be persuasive support for those who
believe that the illegality exception does not necessarily require a
showing of criminality.
While the court did not discuss or address criminality, it did
bring a new concept into the discussion: specificity.165 In the
process of discussing the meaning and impact of the illegality
exception contained in section 425.18(h), the court noted that one
aspect of plaintiff’s burden in establishing illegality is to identify
the illegality with specificity.166 The court advised that “the
plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes
violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying
action.”167 The court further added:
[A]s part of the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating illegality as a
matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in which
the statute or statutes were violated with reference to their elements.
A generalized assertion that a particular statute was violated by the
filing or maintenance of the underlying action without a
particularized showing of the violation will be insufficient to
demonstrate illegality as a matter of law.168

Therefore, following Soukup, a plaintiff who intends to
invoke the illegality exception need not necessarily show that the
actions in question were criminal, but must provide the
particular law establishing the illegality, and the specific manner
in which the law was violated.169
Finally, on a larger scale, one must question whether
Soukup’s reasoning even applies to the development of the
illegality exception in the context of section 425.16. After all,
Soukup’s decision is dependent upon its interpretation of the
legislatively-provided illegality exception in section 425.18.170 As
Justice Werdegar noted in Flatley, if the Legislature wanted this
same type of analysis applied in section 425.16, it would have
amended the statute to reflect this desire, much the way it
implemented the exception in section 425.18(h).171 On the other
hand, Soukup’s analysis and reasoning regarding how section
425.18(h) should be interpreted and implemented is largely based

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48. See also Hutton v. Hafif, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 119–20 (Ct. App. 2007).
Soukup, 139 P.3d at 47–48.
Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 25 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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upon its reading of the Paul and Davis opinions, both of which
were entirely based upon section 425.16.172 Because those cases
shaped the court’s interpretation of the legislatively-created
illegality exception in section 425.18(h), it seems only natural to
use that same interpretation as it applies to the judiciallycreated illegality exception to section 425.16.
ii.
Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.
In the months following the Flatley decision, potential
confusion as to how to apply the illegality exception began to
show among California appellate courts.173 One particular case,
Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., involved an advocacy group
(defendant) who was formed as part of an effort to “expose the
abusive treatment of animals” by Huntingdon Life Sciences, a
biomedical testing lab.174
Plaintiff, Novartis Vaccines and
Diagnostics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, used
Huntingdon in testing some of its products.175
Defendant
engaged in a campaign against plaintiff in which it carried out
“home visits” to plaintiff’s employees, during which defendant’s
agents terrorized plaintiff’s employees by breaking their
windows, vandalizing their cars, and setting off alarms in their
yards, among other tactics.176
Plaintiff filed suit against
defendant seeking an injunction against those acts.177
In response to the complaint, defendant filed a special
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.178 Defendant did
not deny that it engaged in the actions complained of, but rather,
claimed that its actions were protected activity under the antiSLAPP statute because they centered around speech made in a
public forum in connection with a matter of public interest.179
The trial court denied the motion, however, concluding that
defendant “had not met its burden.”180
On appeal, California’s First Appellate District relied upon
Flatley in articulating the application of the illegality exception.
Soukup, 139 P.3d at 46–47.
See, e.g., Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 34–36 (Ct. App. 2006); Guzzetta v. City of Desert
Hot Springs, No. D049595, 2007 WL 549828, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2007).
174 Id. at 29.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 30.
180 Id. at 35.
172
173
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Quoting Flatley, the Novartis court noted that “section 425.16
cannot be invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected
activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that reason, not
protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and
petition.”181 With that principle in mind, the court then turned to
the facts at hand.
It was at this point the court’s analysis began to reveal
confusion in applying Flatley.182 The court engaged in a thorough
analysis of whether the conduct of defendant amounted to
illegality.183 The court noted that the evidence of defendant’s
acts was not in dispute, and that defendant had essentially
conceded that the attacks on plaintiff’s employees were
unlawful.184 As such, the court concluded, the defendant’s
statements were “not the sort of speech section 425.16 was
designed to protect.”185
What is perhaps most confusing about the Novartis opinion
is whether it is applying the illegality exception at all. Clearly
there was an apparent intent to apply the exception, given the
opinion’s thorough review of the Flatley decision.186 As we know
from Paul and Flatley, the plaintiff holds the burden of proof in
establishing that defendant’s purported protected activity is
illegal as a matter of law.187 However, in Novartis, the court held
that the trial court was correct in concluding that defendant “had
failed to show that” the complaint was aimed at speech protected
by section 425.16.188 To this end, it appears that Novartis’ ruling
is based upon a failure by defendant to satisfy its burden.
However, under Paul and Flatley, a defendant would never have
had the burden of disproving illegality in the first instance. As
such, either the illegality exception was applied incorrectly here
(i.e., the court improperly placed the burden on defendant instead
of plaintiff), or it was not applied at all (i.e., the court determined
that it was not speech in the first instance, rather than speech
which lost its protection due to illegality).189

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
183 Id. at 35–36.
184 Id. at 35.
185 Id. at 36.
186 Id. at 34.
187 See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 12 (Cal. 2006); Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102
Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2001).
188 Novartis, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 36.
189 Interestingly, another aspect of Novartis’ application of the anti-SLAPP statute
reveals confusion. Once the court concluded that defendant had failed to satisfy the first
prong, the opinion went ahead and analyzed whether plaintiff had satisfied its burden on
the second prong. See id. at 36–39. However, this second prong analysis is superfluous
181
182
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iii. Birkner v. Lam
A year after the Novartis decision, California’s First
Appellate District again addressed the application of the
illegality exception in Birkner v. Lam.190 In this case, the
defendant, Lam, appealed the denial of his special motion to
strike after the trial court concluded the plaintiffs’ causes of
action were not based upon petitioning activity.191 Though the
trial court did not find that the activity complained of (the service
and refusal to rescind a notice to terminate plaintiffs’ tenancy)
was illegal, it concluded that it did not arise from petitioning
activity.192
On appeal, the court considered both the “arising from” and
illegality arguments.193 With respect to the former, the court
observed that although the prosecution of an unlawful detainer
action itself is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute,
the termination of a tenancy is generally not protected.194
However, where the service of a termination notice is a
prerequisite for filing an unlawful detainer action, as it was in
this case, such service does constitute activity in furtherance of a
constitutionally protected right to petition.195 Therefore, the
court ruled, defendant’s burden on the first prong had been
satisfied.196
The plaintiff then argued that the protection of the antiSLAPP statute should nonetheless be denied in this case because
Lam’s actions in serving the termination notice (in violation of
the San Francisco Administrative Control’s rent ordinance
regulation) were illegal as a matter of law.197 The court
disagreed, holding that the evidence did not “conclusively
establish” Lam’s conduct was illegal as a matter of law.198
Notably, the court’s ruling did not reference any need for
criminality in this context. Rather, the court simply decided
that, because the presented evidence failed to show even a
violation of the rent ordinance, the illegality exception did not
apply.199 Again, it would seem to have been much easier for the
and extraneous in that failure to satisfy the first prong should mean immediate denial of
the motion. There was no need to engage in second prong analysis.
190 Birkner v. Lam, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Ct. App. 2007).
191 Id. at 192.
192 Id. at 194.
193 Id. at 195–98.
194 Id. at 195.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 197–98.
197 Id. at 198.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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court to dispose of defendant’s illegality argument by simply
pointing to the fact that no criminal violations had been asserted.
iv. Cohen v. Brown
California’s Second Appellate District rendered its first
significant decision on the post-Flatley illegality exception in
Cohen v. Brown.200 This case involved a dispute among two
attorneys who were retained to prosecute a personal injury case
on behalf of a person injured in a car accident.201 Brown had
been retained at the outset of the underlying case and filed the
complaint.202 Shortly before trial, Brown contacted Cohen to
obtain his services in preparing for and trying the case.203 Cohen
claimed, however, that Brown misrepresented the amount of
work required on the case and the level of experience Brown had
in trying cases such as this.204 When the case settled before trial,
Brown informed Cohen that he would not be getting any portion
of the attorney’s fees realized from the settlement.205 Brown
further threatened (and later acted upon his threat) to file a
complaint with the State Bar against Cohen, in an effort to force
Cohen to authorize the release of funds to the underlying
plaintiff (with no funds going to Cohen).206
Cohen filed suit against Brown for extortion, among other
claims.207 Brown filed a special motion to strike, claiming his
actions in furtherance of the State Bar complaint were protected
petitioning activity.208 The trial court denied Brown’s motion,
concluding that his actions had an “extortive context,” and were
therefore illegal as a matter of law.209 Brown appealed.210
On appeal, the appellate court relied upon Flatley in
observing that “extortion is not constitutionally protected speech
and thus cannot constitute the ‘valid’ exercise of speech and
petition that is protected by section 425.16.”211 The court went on
to conclude that, as in Flatley, Brown’s actions amounted to
extortion under sections 518, et seq. of the California Penal

200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Cohen v. Brown, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 27–28.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 36 (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 21 (Cal. 2006)).
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Code.212 Having determined that Brown’s stated basis for relief
under the anti-SLAPP statute was not viable, the court ended
the inquiry before reaching the second prong.213 Therefore,
although the court did not explicitly address whether criminality
must be shown before the illegality exception is applied, the
opinion is notable in that it did rely upon the violation of the
Penal Code before applying the illegality exception.214
D. California Appellate Courts Transform the Illegality
Exception into a “Criminality” Exception
i. Cabral v. Martins
Perhaps in recognition of Justice Werdegar’s concern that
the illegality exception would swallow the anti-SLAPP doctrine
as a whole, or perhaps as a consequence of the ambiguous scope
and meaning of the term “illegal as a matter of law,” California
appellate courts have begun to deviate from the original
reasoning in Paul and have started to shape the doctrine into a
consideration of criminality more than illegality.215 Though, as
shown above, the criminality question indirectly played into
several previous decisions, the first opinion to fully commit to the
criminality requirement appears to be Cabral v. Martins.216
Cabral arose from a divorced couple’s ongoing dispute over
the ex-husband’s unpaid child support.217 Meanwhile, the exhusband’s mother revised her estate plan to disinherit him from
her estate.218 The ex-wife, having had past difficulty in collecting
her judgment against her ex-husband, filed suit against, among
others, the attorneys who assisted in revising the mother’s estate
plan.219 The ex-wife’s claim relied upon a California statute
authorizing damages against those who assist a child support
obligor in avoiding payment obligations (sections 1714.4 and
1714.41 of the California Civil Code).220 The attorneys filed a

Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 37.
Id.
See, e.g., Gerbrosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82
(Ct. App. 2011); Ogunsalu v. Gill, No. D057612, 2011 WL 1457190, at *6 (Ct. App. Apr.
15, 2011); Freisleben v. Riper, No. G042825, 2011 WL 940975, at *4–5 (Ct. App. Mar. 18,
2011); Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 303 (Ct.
App. 2010); G.R. v. Intelligator, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 567 (Ct. App. 2010); Roosen v.
Farrell, No. B209873, 2010 WL 3371510, at *10 (Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010); Cabral v.
Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009).
216 Cabral v. Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394 (Ct. App. 2009).
217 Id. at 398.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 399.
212
213
214
215
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special motion to strike the ex-wife’s claims, claiming protection
under the anti-SLAPP statute.221 The trial court granted the
motion and the ex-wife appealed.222
On appeal, the ex-wife sought to employ the illegality
exception by arguing that the attorneys’ actions cannot be
protected because they violated the child support evasion
statute.223 The appellate court disagreed, concluding that even if
the attorneys had violated the statute, the ex-wife’s argument
was without merit.224 The court believed that the ex-wife’s
attempted reliance upon Flatley and Paul was misplaced.225
Flatley, the court noted, was distinguishable from the ex-wife’s
case because in Flatley the court took caution in limiting its
holding “to ‘the specific and extreme circumstances of [the] case,’
in which the assertedly protected communications, as a matter of
law, fell outside the ambit of protected speech.”226 The court
distinguished Paul by noting, in that case, the allegedly
protected actions of the defendants “were admittedly illegal,
under the provisions of a statutory scheme specifically aimed at
confining otherwise protected political activity within
constitutionally valid bounds.”227
The Cabral court further pointed out that, unlike in Flatley
and Paul, in Cabral’s case “the attorney respondents’ actions in
the course of the probate proceedings and the litigation defense
were neither inherently criminal nor otherwise outside the scope
of normal, routine legal services.”228 The court went on, noting
that “[e]ven if the attorney respondents’ actions had the effect of
defeating or forestalling [the ex-wife’s] ability to execute her
judgment for child support, thereby (according to [the ex-wife])
violating the child support evasion statutes, this is not the kind
of illegality involved in Flatley . . . and Paul . . . .”229 In light of
these observations, the court went on to hold that the attorneys’
actions satisfied the first prong’s inquiry of the anti-SLAPP
analysis.230
Though Cabral purported to rely upon and apply the
reasoning behind Paul and Flatley, a closer review of the Cabral

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 24 n.16 (2006)).
Id. at 403.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 404.
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opinion against the backdrop of Paul and Flatley reveals a
marked deviation from the prior cases. Indeed, as emphasized in
the excerpt from the court’s opinion above, the Cabral court
distinguished its case from Paul and Flatley on the basis that it
did not involve inherently criminal behavior.231 However, Paul
(which was wholly endorsed by Flatley) did not involve any
allegation that the defendant had violated the Penal Code or
committed any other criminal act. Instead, the plaintiff in Paul
accused the defendant of violating election laws, not criminal
laws.232 Additionally, nowhere in the Flatley decision does the
supreme court ever discuss the phrase “inherently criminal.”
The Cabral court seems to have made up the “inherently
criminal” standard here.
Moreover, the Cabral court fails to offer any explanation as
to what it means by actions that are “outside the scope of normal,
routine legal services,” or what “kind of illegality” is sufficient for
the illegality exception.233 Since Paul and Flatley never mention
these concepts, Paul and Flatley provide us with no insight as to
their meaning. In fact, as many of the anti-SLAPP cases
preceding Cabral have illustrated, the meaning of the phrase
“illegal as a matter of law” already caused a significant amount
of uncertainty in this area of law.234 With Cabral’s introduction
of additional inquiries regarding the “inherent” criminality of an
act, the breadth of scope for “normal, routine services,” and the
undefined “kind of illegality” deserving of separate treatment
over other unspecified types of illegality, it is even less clear what
is required to employ the illegality exception after Cabral than it
was before.235 Indeed, following Cabral, many would reasonably
conclude that the illegality exception is simply a discretionary
consideration the trial court should employ depending upon the
allegations, evidence, and statutory violations in question on a
case-by-case basis. The problem with such a conclusion is that,
under well-established appellate authority, the standard of
review regarding a trial court’s anti-SLAPP ruling is de novo, not
abuse of discretion;236 and as such, the determination by the trial
judge in the first instance simply cannot be one of discretion on a
case-by-case basis. Beyond that, however, a trial court’s required
approach regarding the illegality exception following Cabral
appears undefined.

231
232
233
234
235
236

Id. at 403.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
See supra Part II(A)–(C).
Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403.
See Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011).
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ii. Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc.
Once Cabral planted the flag for a criminality approach to
the illegality exception, other cases soon began to cement its
stake.237 One notable example of such a case is found in Mendoza
v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc.238 In Mendoza, the
plaintiff sued an employment-screening company (“SASS”),
seeking damages purportedly incurred when the screening
company provided information from the “Megan’s Law” website
to an employer with whom plaintiff had applied for
employment.239
Plaintiff claimed SASS improperly used
information from the website for purposes related to
employment, which amounts to a violation of sections
290.46(1)(2)(E) and (4)(A) of the California Penal Code, and
subjects the company to a civil claim for damages.240
SASS responded to the complaint with a special motion to
strike, claiming that it had a constitutional right under the antiSLAPP statute to republish information from the website to its
clients.241 Though SASS admitted to causing the proliferation of
this information, it claimed that its actions did not violate the
Penal Code section prohibiting “use” of the information for
employment purposes.242 The trial court granted the motion to
strike and plaintiff appealed.243
On appeal, the court considered, among other issues,
whether SASS’ actions in using information from the Megan’s
Law website amounted to illegality sufficient to preclude
application of the anti-SLAPP statute.244 Plaintiff relied upon
Flatley in arguing that SASS’ violation of the applicable Penal
Code sections triggered the illegality exception of the anti-SLAPP
statute.245
The appellate court disagreed, based in large part on its
conclusion that “the [California] Supreme Court’s use of the
phrase ‘illegal’ [in Flatley] was intended to mean criminal, and
not merely violative of a statute.”246 The court supported its
conclusion with two levels of reasoning. For one, it noted, the
See supra note 215.
Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Ct.
App. 2010).
239 Id. at 298–99.
240 Id. at 298.
241 Id. at 299.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 300.
244 See id. at 301–03.
245 Id. at 302–03.
246 Id. at 303.
237
238
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Flatley court applied the illegality exception upon a finding that
Mauro had engaged in criminal extortion, punishable under the
Penal Code.247 Second, the court reasoned, Flatley could not have
intended for just any statutory violation to trigger the illegality
exception because such an approach would undermine the antiSLAPP statute in the first place.248 The court opined that,
because a “plaintiff’s complaint always alleges” some illegal
conduct, a mere statutory violation would give the plaintiff too
easy an opportunity to cancel out the speech protections intended
by the anti-SLAPP statute (reasoning that seems more connected
to Flatley’s concurrence than its majority opinion).249
In applying its interpretation of Flatley to the facts before it,
the Mendoza court concluded that the illegality exception did not
apply.250 The court found SASS’ conduct was neither illegal nor
criminal, as those terms are applied in the anti-SLAPP
context.251 Notably, the court drew this conclusion despite the
fact that the acts in question violated provisions of the Penal
Code. To this point, the court observed that the particular Penal
Code sections violated here (sections 290.46(j) and (l)) did not
amount to either a misdemeanor or felony; instead, they either
served as an enhancement statute (as in subdivision (j)), or they
served to provide civil remedies to the acts in question (as in
subdivision (l)).252
The plaintiff encouraged the appellate court to consider
Novartis, which involved underlying allegations of criminal
conspiracy.253
The appellate court distinguished Novartis,
however, from the instant case.254 Although the court admitted
that, in Novartis, the conduct in question amounted to criminal
conspiracy sufficient to deny anti-SLAPP relief, here, the court
noted, SASS’ conduct was “not of the same criminal nature.”255
The court failed to expand any further on this point to describe
what it meant by the phrase “same criminal nature.” In the end,
the court noted, the illegality exception did not apply because
“SASS did not concede that its underlying conduct was criminal,
nor did the evidence conclusively establish that its conduct was
criminal.”256
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. For similar treatment by subsequent courts, see Cross v. Cooper, 127 Cal.
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Among the interesting aspects of the Mendoza opinion is the
path it takes to arrive at and utilize criminality in the illegality
exception. The Mendoza court relies almost entirely upon Flatley
in its conclusion that an act must be criminal to be exempted
from protection under the statute.257 On the other hand, at no
point does the court ever cite to the Cabral decision. Yet, a
simple review of the two opinions shows that nowhere in the
Flatley decision does the court ever indicate an act must be
“criminal” to be exempted, while Cabral could hardly make the
point less emphatically, as discussed supra.
Perhaps the
Mendoza court preferred to rely upon supreme court precedent
over appellate court precedent, but one would think at least a
passing reference to Cabral would have been appropriate.
Another notable characteristic in Mendoza’s analysis is its
willingness to boldly assert principles missing from the precedent
it cites. For example, the court concludes that the illegality
exception requires a showing that the violation in question
amounts to either a misdemeanor or felony.258 Yet, nowhere in
Flatley, Paul, or any other case on the matter, has a California
court ever concluded a misdemeanor or felony penalty is required
for an act to be exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed,
the Paul opinion never uses the words “crime” or “criminal,” nor
does it ever contemplate any potential criminal consequences
and/or punishments of the underlying act—money laundering.
Certainly, if the Paul court had intended for criminality and
punishment to be its guide, it would surely have commented at
least once as to the criminal, rather than mere illegal, nature of
the conduct in question. Similarly, the Flatley court never
discusses “substantive crimes” versus other, undefined nonsubstantive crimes, in considering application of the illegality
exception. Yet, the Mendoza court used this as a point of
distinction between its facts and Flatley’s. Indeed, with the
exception of Cabral, every case preceding Mendoza emphasized
“illegality” and “unlawfulness” far more than criminality in
determining the application of the illegality exception.

Rptr. 3d 903, 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant was entitled to anti-SLAPP
protection since criminal conduct was not conceded and uncontroverted evidence did not
establish criminal activity); and Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin, No. B218178,
2011 WL 3806350, at *8 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011) (holding that the anti-SLAPP statute
could apply since the conduct in question was not illegal).
257 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
258 Id.
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iii. G.R. v. Intelligator
Nearly a year after California’s First Appellate District
decided Cabral, the Fourth Appellate District considered (and by
implication, adopted) the criminality requirement described by
Cabral and Mendoza. In G.R. v. Intelligator259 the court of
appeal considered whether the illegality exception applied in an
action for invasion of privacy by an ex-husband against his
former wife’s attorney.260 The husband claimed Intelligator
invaded his privacy when, during marital dissolution
proceedings, Intelligator filed a copy of the husband’s credit
report with the court without first redacting the husband’s
sensitive and personal information in the report.261
Intelligator acknowledged her failure to redact, and further
conceded that her actions amounted to a violation of Rule 1.20 of
the California Rules of Court.262 Yet, Intelligator contended she
was entitled to relief under the anti-SLAPP statute because her
actions were protected petitioning activity (in other words,
Flatley did not apply here).263 Husband, on the other hand,
argued that the illegality exception precluded anti-SLAPP relief
for Intelligator because her actions violated a rule of court.264
The court disagreed with the husband, asserting that
Cabral, Paul, and Flatley, establish that conduct must be found
criminal before it will be exempted from the protections of the
anti-SLAPP statute.265 Considering the facts before it, the court
concluded (as in Cabral) that the redaction of personal identifiers
and subsequent violation of the rules of court was “not the type of
criminal activity addressed in either Flatley . . . or Paul.”266 The
husband pointed to the potential sanctions an attorney faces as
punishment for violating a rule of court.267 The court of appeal
found that to be unpersuasive, however, observing that “if an
attorney were subject to a separate action each time he or she
committed a rule violation in the representation of his or her
client, the effect would be to chill the hearty pursuit of a
protected activity—the right to petition.”268 In light of these

G.R. v. Intelligator, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 562.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 561, 565.
263 See id. at 564–67 (citing cases to determine what was protected activity,
supporting Intelligator’s argument that the anti-SLAPP statute could apply).
264 Id. at 564.
265 Id. at 566–67.
266 Id. at 567.
267 Id.
268 Id.
259
260
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principles, the court found the defendant had satisfied the first
prong, and therefore it rested its decision on a determination
regarding the husband’s probability of prevailing on the merits of
his claim.269 As for the state of the illegality exception, the
criminality requirement imposed by Cabral and Mendoza was
strengthened by the analysis put forward by the Intelligator
court.
iv. Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP
As illustrated in one of the most recently published
California opinions on the illegality exception, Gerbosi v. Gaims,
Weil, West, & Epstein, LLP,270 the criminality requirement has
not only taken a firm hold of the illegality exception doctrine, but
the ambiguities in its application are beginning to create
uncertainty with other, previously well-established aspects of the
doctrine.
Gerbosi involved appeals from the denial of two anti-SLAPP
special motions to strike from two separate, but related cases.271
Both cases arose out of events either involving or having some
direct or indirect relation to Anthony Pellicano, a private
investigator who was indicted on conspiracy and wiretapping
charges in 2006 by a federal grand jury.272 In one of the cases,
Erin Finn sued the Gaims law firm alleging seven different
causes of action: invasion of privacy; intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED); unlawful eavesdropping; unfair
competition; negligence; malicious prosecution; and abuse of
process.273 Finn had previously dated one of Gaims’ clients
(Robert Pfeifer), but following their separation, she became
embroiled in litigation with him (both directly and as a witness to
a separate litigation matter involving Pfeifer).274 Finn’s lawsuit
arose from her claim that, after she and Pfeifer separated,
Pfeifer, Gaims, and Pellicano “set out to destroy” her and used
illegal wiretaps and harassing lawsuits to do so.275 Meanwhile,
Michael Gerbosi, who was Finn’s next-door neighbor, also filed
suit against Pfeifer, Gaims, and Pellicano (among others),

269
270

2011).
271
272
273
274
275

Id.
Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
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alleging unlawful wiretapping, unlawful eavesdropping, invasion
of privacy, and other similar claims.276
Gaims filed a special motion to strike Finn’s claims first,
then filed a special motion to strike Gerbosi’s claims a week
later.277 Gaims’ argument for anti-SLAPP relief was similar for
both motions: Gaims contended that the causes of action in each
of the complaints arose from Gaims’ activity as counsel for Pfeifer
in his litigation against Finn, and because neither Finn nor
Gerbosi could show a likelihood of prevailing on their claims, the
two complaints should be stricken.278 Both Finn and Gerbosi
asked the trial court for leave to conduct discovery prior to
opposing the motions, which the court granted.279 Thereafter,
Finn and Gerbosi filed oppositions to the motions, and after
argument the trial court denied both motions.280 Gaims appealed
on each motion.281
California’s Second Appellate District heard Gaims’ appeal.
In rendering its opinion, the court first addressed, and quickly
discarded, Gaims’ appeal of the motion to strike in the Gerbosi
action.282 The court observed that, although Gaims held the
status of a lawyer, the firm had not represented any client in
connection with litigation involving Gerbosi.283 As such, the
court reasoned, the claims of wiretapping and privacy invasion
did not arise out of, and were not conducted in furtherance of,
“protected ‘petitioning’ activity.”284 With that, the court affirmed
the ruling denying Gaims’ motion as to Gerbosi strictly under a
first prong analysis.285
Finn’s complaint presented a more difficult analysis for the
court because Finn and Gaims’ client had been involved in
litigation with each other.286 In addressing Finn’s complaint, the
court separated Finn’s claims into two groups: one for her
invasion of privacy, eavesdropping, and unfair competition
claims, and the second for the rest of her claims.287 With respect
to the first group, the court held that Gaims was not entitled to
anti-SLAPP relief because those causes of action are each “based
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
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Id. at 78–79.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 80–81.
Id.
Id. at 81.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
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on alleged criminal activity.”288 In the court’s opinion, this group
of claims was precluded because each of them was “predicated on
violations of the Penal Code.”289
One of the more confusing aspects of the court’s criminality
conclusion is the fact that, of the three causes of action in this
first group, only one appears based upon the Penal Code:
unlawful eavesdropping (section 632 of the California Penal
Code).290 The other two claims, invasion of privacy and unfair
competition, are not claims governed by the Penal Code, but
rather are claims arising from the California Constitution and
the California Business and Professions Code, respectively.291 In
any event, in light of its criminality conclusion and in reliance
upon Flatley, the court concluded there was no need for a second
prong analysis on these claims.292
As for the second group of claims (IIED, negligence,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process), the court held them
to be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, and the court
engaged in no illegality analysis as to these claims in reaching its
result.293 In other words, although every one of Finn’s claims was
based upon the same underlying actions by Gaims, the court held
one group to be excluded due to illegality but the other to be
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.294 The court offered no
other explanation for this distinction other than the conclusive
statement that it “agree[d] with Gaims that the anti-SLAPP
statute applie[d]” to the latter group of claims.295
The court’s interpretation and application of Flatley to the
first group of claims is worth particular attention here. The
court noted that it understood Flatley “to stand for” the
proposition that “when a defendant’s assertedly protected
activity may or may not be criminal activity, the defendant may
invoke the anti-SLAPP statute unless the activity is criminal as
a matter of law.”296 The Gerbosi court’s opinion goes on to assert
that, in Flatley, “the [California] Supreme Court observed that an
activity could be deemed criminal as a matter of law when a
defendant concedes criminality, or the evidence conclusively

288
289
290
291
292
293
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Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 78.
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Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
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shows criminality.”297 Tellingly, the court chose not to quote, or
even cite to, any portion of the Flatley or Paul opinions for this
point.
The Gerbosi court also opined on the burden shifting process
in the face of the illegality exception, again invoking a
questionable interpretation of Flatley.298 In a partial quote of the
Flatley opinion, the Gerbosi court asserted that Flatley stands for
the proposition that “a defendant’s ‘mere assertion that his or her
underlying activity was constitutionally protected’ will not suffice
to shift to the plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant’s
underlying activity was criminal, and not constitutionally
protected.”299 Such a rule, Gerbosi adds—again partially quoting
Flatley—would “eviscerate the first step of the two-step inquiry
set forth in the anti-SLAPP statute.”300 In other words, under
Gerbosi’s view, a claim of petitioning activity by the defendant
does not shift any burden of proof to plaintiff to show criminality
to fend off anti-SLAPP protection; a plaintiff need only allege
defendant’s purported protected activities are criminal as a
matter of law and the inquiry ends.301
However, taking a closer look back at Flatley, the point it
was making when it contemplated an evisceration of the first
step was of a more subtle, although important, difference than
the one which Gerbosi attributes to it. Flatley’s entire statement,
from which Gerbosi draws its partial quotation, provided:
[I]t would eviscerate the first step of the two-step inquiry set forth in
the statute if the defendant’s mere assertion that his underlying
activity was constitutionally protected sufficed to shift the burden to
the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing where it could be
conclusively shown that the defendant’s underlying activity was illegal
and not constitutionally protected.302

Thus, Flatley cautioned us that an assertion of protected
conduct, by itself, should not shift the burden to plaintiff to show
a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.303 Gerbosi
misapplied this point, concluding that the assertion of protected
conduct by a defendant should not, by itself, shift the burden to
plaintiff to show illegality as a matter of law.304

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
299 Id. (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 13
(Cal. 2006)).
300 Id. (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13).
301 Id.
302 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13 (emphasis added).
303 Id.
304 Gerbosi, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 82.
297
298
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Indeed, on this point Gerbosi again fails to refer to the Paul
opinion. In fact, Gerbosi never once cites to Paul throughout its
entire opinion. Gerbosi even shies away from those portions of
the Flatley opinion which discuss Paul on this point. Had
Gerbosi focused on Flatley’s thorough discussion of Paul, its
position on burden shifting might be different. Flatley, after all,
quotes and endorses the portion of Paul’s opinion where it
describes the burden of demonstrating illegality as falling on the
plaintiff:
[I]f the plaintiff contested the validity of the defendant’s exercise of
protected rights “and unlike the case here, cannot demonstrate as a
matter of law that the defendant’s acts do not fall under section
425.16’s protection, then the claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s
acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the
context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s burden to provide a prima
facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.305

Recall, it was Paul’s reasoning that the Flatley court found
persuasive and controlling in announcing its holding. And, in the
process of describing how the illegality exception should operate,
it was Paul that described that establishing illegality was an
“additional burden” held by plaintiff—a
burden [that] should be met in the same manner the plaintiff meets
the burden of demonstrating the merits of its causes of action: by
showing the defendant’s purported constitutional defenses are not
applicable to the case as a matter of law or by a prima facie showing of
facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate such
defenses.306

Gerbosi’s refusal to shift this additional burden upon the
plaintiff (and thus, allowing it to rest exclusively upon its
allegations) marks a stark departure from the procedure
envisioned by Paul and the other courts who subsequently
adopted Paul’s vision. This includes the California Supreme
Court’s decisions in Flatley and Soukup (the latter of which noted
that “a defendant who invokes the anti-SLAPP statute should
not be required to bear the additional burden of demonstrating in
the first instance that the filing and maintenance of the
underlying action was not illegal as a matter of law,” and that “as
part of the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating illegality as a
matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in

305 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12 (quoting Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
864, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2001)).
306 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872 (quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
446, 455 (Ct. App. 1994)).
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which the statute or statutes were violated with reference to
their elements”).307
III. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OUTLOOK OF THE ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE’S ILLEGALITY EXCEPTION
What started with a limited and fact-specific carve-out of the
anti-SLAPP statute—molded in its infancy by cases like Paul,
Kashian, and Flatley—has been simultaneously retracted and
expanded into an amorphous and ambiguous doctrine operating
far different than these initial cases intended.308 The discussion
below considers the questions: how did the doctrine arrive at its
current state and what impact will its changes have on future
application of the doctrine?
A. Where Does the Illegality Exception Stand Now and How
Did It Get Here?
In its early phases, Paul and Kashian set the stage for how
the illegality exception would operate. Paul was careful to note
that the exception would have only very limited application;
indeed, Paul emphasized the exception would only be applied in
the rare instances of where a party concedes illegality as to its
purported protected speech and/or activity, or where such
illegality could be shown as a matter of law.309 Kashian, taking
heart to this limited application, further noted that the requisite
illegality was not something that could be established through
mere allegations; illegality was an aspect of the exception that
must be proven.310 And, as Paul and others added, the illegality
requirement was an “additional” burden of proof carried by the
plaintiff, above and beyond the plaintiff’s burden of proving a
likelihood of success as part of the second prong analysis.311
Flatley, and its companion case Soukup, endorsed and
adopted the illegality exception.312
And, perhaps more
importantly, the California Supreme Court endorsed the
exception within the specific confines laid out in Paul (and to a
lesser extent Davis and Kashian).313

Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 47–48 (Cal. 2006).
See, e.g., Gerbosi, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 82; Mendoza v. ADP Screening and
Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 303 (Ct. App. 2010); Cabral v. Martins, 99
Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009).
309 Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871–72.
310 Kashian v. Harriman, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 590 (Ct. App. 2002).
311 See, e.g., Soukup, 139 P.3d at 48; Kashian, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590; Paul, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 871–72.
312 Soukup, 139 P.3d at 47; Flatley v. Mauro 139 P.3d 2, 13 (Cal. 2006).
313 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13.
307
308
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Moving forward to the illegality exception’s present
application, however, the focus of the doctrine appears to have
changed. Illegality has become synonymous with criminality.
Despite the fact that neither Paul, nor Davis, nor Kashian, nor
Flatley, nor Soukup ever state that criminality is a requirement
for applying the doctrine, subsequent cases such as Cabral,
Mendoza, and Gerbosi all equate illegality with criminality.314 In
fact, by the time the Second Appellate District decided Gerbosi,
the illegality exception not only required that the underlying
actions/speech be subject to the Penal Code, but that the
actions/speech be punishable by either a misdemeanor or felony
charge.315 Actions subject to other penalties under the Penal
Code, such as sentence enhancements or civil penalties, no longer
suffice to establish application of the illegality exception.
Notably, the underlying actions in cases such as Paul and
Soukup—and later Novartis—are not based upon and do not
otherwise reference any Penal Code violations.
Expanding the meaning of “illegality” is not the only
development in the doctrine, as seen above. The burden of proof
has also evolved. By way of Paul and Flatley, among other
decisions, California courts had initially established that the
plaintiff held the burden of proving illegality, either as a matter
of law or by way of a concession by the defendant.316 Starting
with Novartis and later Gerbosi, however, plaintiff’s burden
appears far less than it once was, and perhaps may be gone
altogether. Notably, under Gerbosi, a plaintiff need only allege
illegality (or, more accurately stated, criminality), to initiate the
exception.317 Indeed, so long as the plaintiff at least alleges
criminality (and so long as such allegation is punishable by
felony or misdemeanor), the defendant appears foreclosed from
any protection in the anti-SLAPP statute.318
As such, under the latest California precedent applying the
anti-SLAPP statute, a proactive plaintiff who anticipates an antiSLAPP challenge would be wise to specifically tailor his or her
complaint in a manner that insulates the lawsuit from antiSLAPP challenge. Such a plaintiff should allege that the
314 See Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 (Ct.
App. 2011); Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Servs., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294,
303 (Ct. App. 2010); Cabral v. Martins, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2009).
315 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303; Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403.
316 Flatley, 139 P.3d at 12; Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871–72.
317 See Gerbosi, 122 Cal Rptr. 3d at 82 (“[A] defendant’s ‘mere assertion that his [or
her] underlying activity was constitutionally protected’ will not suffice to shift to the
plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant’s underlying activity was criminal, and
not constitutionally protected.” (quoting Flatley, 139 P.3d at 13)).
318 Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
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underlying speech and/or petitioning activities giving rise to the
lawsuit are criminal. So long as these allegations are made with
particularity (ideally identifying the Penal Code section that
would apply if pursued as a criminal matter), the lawsuit should
be able to survive a special motion to strike challenge (assuming
the court follows Gerbosi). Ironically, in such a scenario, even if
the lawsuit were a SLAPP, it would be permitted to continue as
long as it meets these superficial pleading requirements.
On the other hand, a defendant faced with such a complaint
would be wise to characterize the claims as primarily based upon
civil remedies (to the extent possible) and otherwise based upon
actions which cannot be punished by misdemeanor or felony
charges. Such a defendant should also be prepared to carry the
burden of proof on such characterization, but the defendant can
take solace in the fact that success in characterizing the
complaint in this fashion will advance the defendant to, at the
very least, a second-prong determination forcing the plaintiff to
show a likelihood of success on the merits. The defendant in this
scenario faces a steep uphill battle since a well-pled complaint is
seemingly impossible to beat. However, because so few civil
claims are brought under the Penal Code, there may be room for
maneuvering by defendants.
So how did we arrive at such an inconsistent application of
the illegality exception? Much of the explanation for this lies in
the Cabral, Mendoza, and Gerbosi courts’ overlooking of Paul (or
their otherwise refusal to apply Paul). In reaching its implied
conclusion that the illegality exception required a showing that
the questioned activity was inherently criminal or otherwise
outside the scope of normal, routine legal services, the Cabral
court claimed its facts were distinguishable from Paul (and
Flatley for that matter).319 Cabral noted that, unlike Paul and
Flatley, its facts did not involve inherent criminality. Cabral
appears to overlook the fact that Paul did not involve any
allegations or proof that the defendant had violated any Penal
Code section.320
Mendoza, in following Cabral’s lead, not only incorporates
new elements into the illegality exception analysis, it also
appears to ignore Paul altogether. Mendoza arrives at its
conclusion (that the illegality exception did not apply in its case)
because the purportedly illegal conduct was not criminal, and
better yet, did not involve punishment by either misdemeanor or

319
320

Cabral, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 403.
Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.
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felony.321 Strangely, however, Mendoza carries out this analysis
without ever once citing to the Paul opinion.
Gerbosi continues the trend of ignoring Paul (and by
extension Flatley, as it relied upon Paul). Like Mendoza, Gerbosi
never once cites to Paul throughout its opinion, despite Paul’s
undeniable influence on the development of the illegality
exception.322 Perhaps the Gerbosi court’s disregard for Paul was
born out of the parties’ failure to rely upon or argue Paul during
the appeal; a closer look at the briefs on appeal in Gerbosi reveal
that neither the appellant nor the respondent ever cites to Paul
throughout their briefing on appeal.323
Consequently, the
Gerbosi court devotes no attention to Paul in its opinion, thus
never relying upon Paul’s guidance regarding the scope of
illegality’s meaning or the shifting of burdens among plaintiff
and defendant throughout this process.
In any event, the bottom line for future parties and courts
addressing the illegality exception is one of uncertainty. Some
may follow Paul, Kashian, and Flatley’s reasoning in applying
the early, California Supreme Court-endorsed version of the
doctrine. This group will utilize the illegality exception where a
plaintiff has carried its burden of proof in establishing illegality
by the defendant, either as a matter of law or as conceded by the
defendant. Conversely, others will follow Cabral, Mendoza, and
Gerbosi. This group will apply the exception where the plaintiff
has merely alleged criminality by the defendant, but only where
such criminality is shown to be punishable by misdemeanor or
felony.
And, needless to say, future parties will face
unpredictable (and likely contradictory) decisions as a result.
B. How Do We Resolve These Uncertainties?
i. Legislative Amendment
It is generally recognized that “[u]ncertainty undermines the
rule of law.”324 As seen above, uncertainty regarding application
of the illegality exception has already begun to undermine the
principles which the state’s anti-SLAPP laws seek to protect;
and, as such, the current state of contradiction and
Mendoza, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
See Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868, 870.
323 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122
Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2011) (No. B219587), 2010 WL 1703225; Respondents’ Brief,
Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2010) (No.
B219587), 2010 WL 3022530; Appellants’ Reply Brief, Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West &
Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. B219587), 2010 WL 4155938.
324 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1149, 1160 (1997).
321
322
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unpredictability must be addressed. The most ideal manner for
this will occur in the legislative setting. Recall that the
Legislature has previously addressed the illegality exception as it
pertains to the SLAPPback statute. More specifically, as part of
enacting section 425.18, the Legislature enacted a provision
specifically incorporating elements of the illegality exception to
SLAPPback suits: “A special motion to strike may not be filed
against a SLAPPback by a party whose filing or maintenance of
the prior cause of action from which the SLAPPback arises was
illegal as a matter of law.”325 In enacting this provision, the
Legislature appears to have been influenced by Paul, as
particularly evidenced by: (1) the timing of the enactment of
section 425.18 (i.e., after Paul and before Flatley), and (2) the use
of phrases such as “illegal” and “as a matter of law.”326
Of course, given developments in the doctrine subsequent to
Flatley, simply enacting legislation similar to that imposed in
section 425.18(h) will be of little assistance. In other words,
codifying the principle that anti-SLAPP protection is unavailable
to a party whose underlying actions were “illegal as a matter of
law”327 would do nothing to cure the current inconsistencies
regarding the questions of criminality and burden of proof.
Future courts and litigants need guidance specifically targeted
toward whether criminality is a prerequisite for the exception
and who is to carry the burden of proof in determining whether
the exception will be imposed. Any meaningful legislative
assistance must directly address these two issues. If criminality
is a requirement for illegality, the Legislature should specifically
state as much as part of a modification to section 425.16. And if
so, the Legislature should also indicate what criminality means.
Is the underlying action required to be subject to a provision of
the Penal Code? Does it mean that the underlying action must
be punishable by a misdemeanor and/or felony? Whether the
Legislature endorses or rejects a criminality requirement, it
should spell out what is required to avoid the current uncertainty
that exists.
Any legislative involvement also must address uncertainty
regarding burden of proof. Early case law on the illegality
exception appeared to unequivocally place this burden on the
plaintiff, but recent cases have shown a hesitation to engage in
such burden shifting. The Legislature should specifically set out
who holds the burden in consideration of the exception, and what

325
326
327

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(h) (West 2011).
Id.
Id.
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level of proof needs to be meet (i.e., mere allegation or proof as a
matter of law).
Legislative involvement could go a long way to tighten the
application of the illegality exception. But, in order to have any
meaningful impact, such legislative involvement must at a
minimum address the issues outlined above.
ii. Clarification from the California Supreme Court
Should the Legislature fail or otherwise choose not to enact
legislation clarifying application of the illegality exception, the
California Supreme Court will be the next-best source for
returning consistency in this area of law. Granting review of an
appeal involving these issues will not only allow the opportunity
to cure inconsistencies in the law and provide courts greater
guidance on application of this doctrine, it would serve as a great
opportunity to return the doctrine to the roots upon which it is
based.
As emphasized above, any examination by the supreme court
should focus upon the reasoning employed by early cases
invoking the exception, particularly Paul and Flatley. In all
likelihood, such a focus would render the Cabral and Gerbosi
opinions a short life-span, at least to the extent they are read as
holding criminality a prerequisite for the illegality exception.
Paul and other early cases addressing the illegality
exception began their analysis with focused consideration toward
the underlying purpose and intent behind the anti-SLAPP
statute. As Paul observes, though the statute encourages the
“continued participation in matters of public significance,” it is
unlikely the Legislature intended to give defendants a means by
which to protect themselves for their illegal activities.328 Thus,
Paul concluded, “while it is technically true that laundering
campaign contributions is an act in furtherance of the giving of
such contributions, that is, in furtherance of an act of free speech,
we reject the notion that section 425.16 exists to protect such
illegal activity.”329
Flatley also reminds us that the underlying purpose of
section 425.16 is to prevent chilling of the “valid exercise” of free
speech and petitioning rights.330 “As a necessary corollary to this
statement, because not all speech or petition activity is

Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869.
Id. at 871.
330 Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2006). See also Soukup v. Law Offices of
Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 42 (Cal. 2006).
328
329
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constitutionally protected, not all speech or petition activity is
protected by section 425.16.”331 Certainly, the Legislature in
adopting section 425.16 and by extension carving out a litigation
protection against lawsuits arising from acts in furtherance of
one’s “right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or California Constitution,”332 never intended to
protect speech otherwise unprotected by the United States and
California Constitutions. This therefore begs the question: what
type of speech do these constitutions refuse to protect?
In Wilcox v. Superior Court, the Second Appellate District
deliberated this very question in considering whether to apply
the anti-SLAPP statute to a dispute between a group of certified
court reporters and a separate alliance of reporters.333 The
plaintiff/cross-defendants sought to strike the alliance’s crosscomplaint, and following the trial court’s denial of their motion to
strike, the plaintiff/cross-complainant sought a writ of mandate
challenging the trial court’s determination.334 The appellate
court ordered the mandate be issued, based on a finding that the
motion to strike should have been granted.335
In the process of reaching its decision, the Wilcox court was
faced with the question of what the anti-SLAPP statute “means
by ‘furtherance’ of the defendant’s ‘right of petition or free
speech.’”336 The court addressed this question by analogy. If, for
example, a defendant’s “act” in furtherance of its speech and
petitioning rights was “a lawsuit against a developer,” the
defendant would have a prima facie First Amendment defense
(and thus the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis would be
satisfied).337 If, however, “the defendant’s act was burning down
the developer’s office as a political protest the defendant’s
[special] motion to strike could be summarily denied without
putting the developer to the burden of establishing the
probability of success on the merits in a tort suit against the
defendant.”338 In other words, in enacting the statute, the
Legislature meant to protect acts such as the filing of lawsuits as
a form of speech and petitioning activity, but did not want to
protect destruction of property even though such actions are a
form of speech.

331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

Flatley, 139 P.3d at 331.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2011).
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 448 (Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 452 (quoting CIV. PROC. § 425.16(a)).
Id.
Id. at 452–53.
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As Wilcox illustrates, we must draw a line between speech
that is protected and speech that is not protected, and apply that
line in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute’s illegality
exception. Where do we draw that line? The most prudent
source in answering this question would seem to lie in the wellestablished precedent addressing First Amendment rights and
particularly those cases deciding protected and unprotected
speech. Of course, a discussion examining the treatment of
illegal speech and First Amendment protection would span
volumes far beyond the confines of the instant article. However,
even a brief sampling of California and federal cases addressing
this issue shows that the line between protected and unprotected
speech deviates from the mere consideration of whether speech is
criminal or not; though, at the same time, it appears foolish to
completely remove the consideration of criminality from this
analysis.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has observed, “the
goal of the First Amendment is to protect expression that
engages in some fashion in public dialogue, that is,
‘communication in which the participants seek to persuade, or
are persuaded; communication which is about changing or
maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to take action on the
basis of one’s beliefs.’”339 But, as the court adds, “[a]s speech
strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free
exchange of ideas, and moves toward willful threats to perform
illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to regulate
expression.”340 And, as we have seen, threats are but one area
where the First Amendment has allowed restrictions on speech;
other categories of restricted speech “include defamatory speech,
fighting words, incitement to riot or imminent lawless action,
obscenity and child pornography.”341 California courts, such as
Larson v. City and County of San Francisco, have also added
that, “[l]ike ordinary speech, commercial speech that is
misleading, fraudulent, or concerns unlawful activity is not
protected at all by the First Amendment.”342
As this list of restricted categories of speech reveals, mere
criminality is not the test for determining protection. Indeed, the
test for determining whether speech is protected is a difficult and
fact-specific one, as the United States Supreme Court

339 In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Shackelford v. Shirley, 948
F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991)).
340 M.S., 896 P.2d at 1371.
341 Larson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 57 (Ct. App. 2011).
342 Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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acknowledged in its recent decision, United States v. Stevens.343
While the Court acknowledged that it “has often described
historically unprotected categories of speech as being ‘of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality,’” the determination is not one based on a
simple cost-benefit analysis.344 The Stevens decision points to the
child pornography scenario as a prime example. There, the
Supreme Court recognized a limitation on speech not only as a
result of a cost-benefit analysis, but also in recognition that the
speech in question was “‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying
abuse, and was therefore ‘an integral part of the production of
such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.’”345 As
the Supreme Court noted in New York v. Ferber, the child
pornography case, “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute.”346
Thus, we can conclude that speech can be restricted under
the First Amendment where it is “an integral part of” a crime (i.e.
extortion, as in Flatley), or where it is “misleading, fraudulent, or
concerns unlawful activity” as noted in Larson. Though the line
does not appear drawn specifically at criminality, criminality
certainly plays a substantial role in this analysis. As such, to
base application of the illegality exception solely upon criminality
would circumscribe the exception more narrowly than the
Legislature and the United States and California Constitutions
appear to intend. Perhaps the California Supreme Court, to the
extent it decides to take on this issue, will use criminality as a
guide-post in refining the illegality exception, and implement
criminality more appropriately as a starting point than an end
point in the anti-SLAPP context.

343
344

(1992)).

See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383

345 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 759, 761 (1982)).
346 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949)).

